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Abstract—We study the problem of private key generation in
a cooperative pairwise independent network (PIN), with M + 2
terminals (Alice, Bob and M relays), M  2. In the PIN,
the correlated source observed by every pair of terminals, is
independent of the sources observed by any other pairs of
terminals. Moreover, all terminals can communicate with each
other over a public channel, which is also observed by Eve,
noiselessly. The objective is to generate a private key between
Alice and Bob with the help of the M relays; such a private
key needs to be protected not only from Eve but also from
all relays. A single-letter expression for the private key capacity
of this PIN model is obtained, where the achievability part is
established by proposing a random binning (RB) based key
generation algorithm, and the converse part is established by
deriving upper bounds of M enhanced source models. Next,
we consider a cooperative wireless network and use estimates
of fading channels to generate private keys. It has been shown
that the proposed RB key generation algorithm can achieve a
multiplexing gain of M   1, which is an improvement compared
with the existing XOR algorithm, whose achievable multiplexing
gain is bM=2c.
Index Terms—Information-theoretic security, private key gen-
eration, private key capacity, PIN model, multiplexing gain
I. INTRODUCTION
The generation of information-theoretically secure symmet-
ric keys between a pair of legitimate users, has received
considerable attention from an aspect of information-theoretic
security [2]. The works in [3] and [4] first introduced the
source model with public discussion to generate secret keys. In
this two-terminal discrete memoryless source (DMS) model,
the two terminals, namely Alice and Bob, observe a correlated
source and can communicate with each other via a public
channel, while the eavesdropper (Eve) can also access the pub-
lic discussion noiselessly. Using a point-to-point distributed
source coding technique [5], it has been shown that Alice
and Bob can generate a secret key, by extracting common
randomness from their correlated source observations. The
work in [6] first investigated the multi-terminal DMS model,
where a group of terminals, denoted as A, wish to share a
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common secret key with the help of the remaining terminals.
The group key capacity was established based on the concept
of “omniscience”, i.e., the terminals publicly communicate
using the minimum rate to enable each terminal in A to
reconstruct near-losslessly all terminals’s source observations.
Based on omniscience, the secret key capacities of many other
multi-terminal DMS models were also established, such as in
[7]–[11].
The pairwise independent network (PIN), is actually a
special case of the multi-terminal DMS model presented in
[6]. In a PIN model, the correlated source observed by every
pair of terminals is independent of the sources observed by
any other pairs of terminals. A variety of PIN models has been
investigated recently, such as in [7], [12]–[15]. Instead of the
omniscience scheme, existing works in [7], [12]–[15] proposed
more efficient graph-based key generation algorithms. The
basic idea is to represent the PIN model by a multigraph
and propagate secret keys over this multigraph using the one-
time pad [2]. In general, the study of the PIN model is
motivated by practical aspects of a wireless communication
network. Based on the channel reciprocity in time-division
duplex (TDD) systems, the correlated source observations
in a PIN model can be obtained by estimating the wireless
fading channels, associated with the legitimate terminals. This
is because all wireless channels in a network are mutually
independent, as long as the terminals are half-wavelength
away from each other [16]. This physical layer (PHY) security
approach has been recognized recently as a promising solution
for generating secret keys (e.g., [17]–[23]).
Scanning the open literature on source models, cooperation
from external helper nodes has been demonstrated to be
effective, in improving generated key rates [6], [11], [13],
[15], [21], [22], [24]. Motivated by this, the present work
aims to investigate the private key1 generation problem in a
cooperative PIN model with M +2 terminals (Alice, Bob and
M relays). With the help of the M relays, Alice and Bob
wish to establish a private key, which should be protected not
only from Eve but also from all relays. A practical example of
this model is a government intelligence network, where it is
assumed that not every terminal has the same level of access
to the key information, despite operating with agreed protocols
and serving as relay nodes in the network. The private key
generation problem in the source model is analogous to secure
1When the generated secret key needs to be protected not only from Eve
but also from unintended terminals (including the helper nodes), it is termed
as a “private key” [6], [24], [25]. The private key obviously has a higher
security level than a general secret key that is protected only from Eve.
2transmission in the wiretap channel model2 with an untrusted
relay [28]–[30], where a transmitter wish to send a message
to a receiver with the help of a relay but requires this message
to be secret from the relay.
The main contribution in this paper is the development
of a RB key generation algorithm, in order to achieve the
derived outer bound, and thus the private key capacity of the
considered model is established. To prove the achievability of
the private key capacity, a algorithm is proposed for generating
the private key. Specifically, using the point-to-point pairwise
key generation technique [3], [4] and the one-time pad [2],
Alice and Bob first agree on M common messages, where
each of them is open to a certain relay. Then, a random
binning (RB) process is adopted in the key distillation step, in
order to map these insecure common messages into the private
key. Such an algorithm is termed for simplicity as the RB
algorithm. Compared to the concept of omniscience [6]–[11],
the proposed scheme only requires Alice (Bob) to reconstruct
the pairwise key between each relay and Bob (Alice) rather
than their source observations. Furthermore, in order to prove
the converse, the upper bound of the private key capacity is
obtained by considering M enhanced source models, where
each of them relaxes the secrecy constraints on some relays,
and assumes that part of the relay observations are known by
Alice or Bob. The result shows that such an upper bound is
tight and matches well with the achievable key rate.
We then consider the key generation problem in the co-
operative wireless relay network, where it is assumed that
a direct link between Alice and Bob does not exist, due to
deep fading. The RB algorithm, proposed for the PIN model,
is applied to this wireless network, using estimates of the
random channels associated with the relays. Compared to the
XOR algorithm in [21], that achieves a multiplexing gain,
bM=2c, for the considered wireless network, the proposed
RB algorithm achieves a multiplexing gain, equal to M   1.
This is because the proposed approach pays less price for
satisfying the secrecy constraints at the relays, by using the
RB process to simultaneously confuse all relays. Moreover, the
developed principles used to establish the private key capacity
are extended to several more general models, i.e., the PIN
models with direct link between Alice and Bob, with secrecy
constraint on only part of relays, with colluding relays, and
with multiple terminals wishing to share a group key.
Note that the RB scheme has been widely used for gener-
ating an information-theoretically secure key (e.g., [11], [19],
[25], [31]–[33]), whose basic idea is to map the generated
common randomness between the legitimate terminals into
a random and secret key. However, the works in [19], [25],
[31], [32] consider key generation problems without any helper
node. In contrast, this work is to investigate the cooperative
key generation problem with the help of relay nodes. The
works in [11], [33] investigate the problem of generating
multiple keys with the help of a single relay node, whereas this
paper addresses a more general scenario with multiple relay
2The wiretap channel was first studied by Wyner in [26], and generalized
by Csiza´r and Ko¨rner in [27]. Since public communication was not allowed
in this model, secret key generation was tantamount to secure transmission
over the noisy channel.
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Fig. 1. The source observations of the consideredM -relay PIN model, where
Alice and Bob wish to agree on a private key with the help of M relays.
nodes. Particularly for the case with multiple non-colluding
relays, the feature that each relay does not have access to
the other relays’ sources enables the legitimate terminals to
utilize these untrusted relays for private key generation. To
the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first work in the
open literature which uses the RB scheme to the considered
multiple-relay source model for private key generation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II,
introduces the definition of considered PIN model. Section III,
presents the private key capacity, and provides the proof steps
for establishing the key capacity. Then, in Section IV, the
proposed RB algorithm is extended to a cooperative wireless
network. In Section V, several more general PIN models are
considered. Concluding remarks are provided in Section VI.
Throughout the paper, we denote a random variable (RV)
with an upper case letter (e.g. X), its finite alphabet with
a calligraphic letter (e.g., X ), and its realization with lower
case letter (e.g., x). The probability mass function (pmf) of
X is denoted as p(x). Moreover, E(X) is the expectation of
X , and jX j is the size of X . Finally, Xn denotes a n-vector
fX1;    ; Xng, whose i-th element is Xi.
II. A PAIRWISE INDEPENDENT NETWORK
Consider a cooperative DMS model with M + 2 terminals
(Alice, Bob andM relays,M  2) and a passive eavesdropper
(Eve). With the help of the relays, Alice and Bob wish to
establish a private key that needs to be protected not only
from Eve but also from all relays. These relays are assumed
to be curious but honest, i.e., they comply with the proposed
transmission schemes for helping Alice and Bob to generate
a key, but would also try to intercept the key information if
possible [21]. The terminals can communicate to each other
over a public channel with infinite capacity, but the transmitted
information over the public channel is also available to Eve
noiselessly.
For m 2 f1;    ;Mg, let Ym;A and YA;m denote the
correlated source observations at Alice and relay m, re-
spectively, where Ym;B and YB;m are the correlated source
observations at Bob and relay m, respectively. Specifically,
Alice observes n independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
repetitions of the RV XA , (Y1;A;    ; YM;A), denoted as
XnA , (Y n1;A;    ; Y nM;A); Bob observes n i.i.d. repetitions
of the RV XB , (Y1;B ;    ; YM;B), denoted by XnB ,
3(Y n1;B ;    ; Y nM;B); relay m observes n i.i.d. repetitions of the





This multi-terminal DMS model belongs to a PIN in the sense
that [12]
I(Yi;; Y;i; fYj; ; Y;j : (j; ) 6= (i; )g) = 0;
for i; j 2 f1;    ;Mg;;  2 fA;Bg: (1)
This implies that each source accessible to a pair of terminals
(e.g., the source (Ym;A; YA;m) accessible to Alice and relay
m) is independent of all the other sources. This model does
not include the correlated sources, observed by the pair of
Alice and Bob, nor any pair of the relays.
Remark 1: The considered relay network in Fig. 1 is anal-
ogous to the so-called “diamond” relay network [34]–[38].
However, these existing works investigated the diamond relay
network from reliability perspective [34], [35] or security
perspective for channel models [36]–[38], which are funda-
mentally different from this work.
More definitions in this PIN model are given below:
 Without loss of generality, assume that the terminals use
the public channel to communicate in a round robin fashion
over q rounds. Let 1  l  q, and 1  m  M .
Specifically, relay m transmits during rounds l satisfying
l mod (M + 2) = m; (2)
Alice transmits during rounds l satisfying
l mod (M + 2) = M + 1; (3)
and Bob transmits during rounds l satisfying
l mod (M + 2) = 0: (4)
 A (2n ~R1 ;    ; 2n ~Rq ) code for key generation consists of :
(i) M + 2 randomized encoders, one for each terminal.
In rounds l satisfying (2), relay m generates an index Fl 2
f1;    ; 2n ~Rlg according to p(fljxnm; f l 1); in rounds l
satisfying (3), Alice generates an index Fl 2 f1;    ; 2n ~Rlg
according to p(fljxnA; f l 1); finally, in rounds l satisfying
(4), Bob generates an index Fl 2 f1;    ; 2n ~Rlg according
to p(fljxnB ; f l 1).
(ii) Two decoders, for Alice (decoder A) and Bob
(decoder B), respectively. After receiving the q rounds of
transmissions (i.e., F q = fF1;    ; Fqg) over the public
channel, decoder A generates a random key KA, according
to KA = KA(XnA; F
q), and Decoder B generates a random
key KB , according to KB = KB(XnB ; F
q).
 A private key rate R is said to be achievable, if there exists
a (2n ~R1 ;    ; 2n ~Rq ) code such that
Pr(KA 6= KB)  ; (5)
1
n











q)  ; for 8m 2 f1;    ;Mg; (8)
where jKAj denotes the size of the alphabet of key KA.
Note that, following the definitions in [3], [19]–[24], the
constraint on KB is redundant. Since KA and KB are the
same with a high probability (shown in (5)), KB can also
satisfy (6)-(8), and the individual secrecy constraint on KA
can guarantee the joint secrecy constraint on KA and KB .
Remark 2: Different from the original definition of the
private key in [6] with respect to the fully colluding relays,
this paper mainly considers the case that all relay nodes are
non-colluding as shown in (8). The case with colluding
relays nodes will be considered later in Section V-C.
 The private key capacity CK is the supremum of all
achievable rates R. Next, C(D)K is used to denote the
private key capacity with deterministic encoding and key
generation functions. In Section III-B, we will show that
C
(D)
K = CK , which means that randomization is useless
for key generation in the addressed source model.
III. PRIVATE KEY CAPACITY OF THE PIN MODEL
For simplicity, we first define
Ii , min fI(Yi;A;YA;i); I(Yi;B ;YB;i)g ;8i 2 f1;    ;Mg:
(9)
Furthermore, these parameters are ordered as I(1)  I(2) 
    I(M).
Theorem 1: For the considered PIN model with M re-










Proof: To prove the achievability, a key generation algo-
rithm is proposed based on two steps: key agreement and key
distillation. In the key agreement step, based on the point-
to-point key generation technique [3], [4] and the one-time
pad [2], Alice and Bob agree on M common messages with
the help of the relays. In the key distillation step, both Alice
and Bob map all common messages into the unique codeword
in the pre-constructed private-key codebook, and set the bin
number of this codeword as the final private key. Note that
such a private-key codebook is generated based on the RB
scheme, so it provides necessary randomness, such that the
bin number is secret from all relays and Eve.
To prove the converse, M symmetric enhanced source
models will be constructed. In each enhanced model, the
secrecy constraint on the relays is relaxed, and Alice or Bob
is assumed to have the a priori knowledge of the observations
of part of relays.
The details of the proof will be provided in the following
two subsections.
Example 1: Let the source observation pair (YA;i; Yi;A)










8 2 fA;Bg, 8i 2 f1;    ;Mg, where 0 < qA; qB < 1=2 and
(x; y) =

0; if x 6= y;
1; if x = y; : Straightforward analysis gives
4Algorithm 1: Proposed RB Algorithm for PIN model
Step 1: Key Agreement:
 Alice and Relay i agree on a pairwise key WA;i from the
correlated observations (Y ni;A; Y
n
A;i), i = 1;   M .
 Bob and Relay i agree on a pairwise key WB;i from the
correlated observations (Y ni;B ; Y
n
B;i), i = 1;   M .
 Relay i sends WA;i WB;i over the public channel, so
Alice and Bob can obtain both WA;i and WB;i, i =
1;   M . Then they will choose the one with a smaller
size as the common message, denoted as Wi 2 Wi.
Step 2: Key Distillation:
 In advance, randomly partition all sequences wM in
WM , W1  W2      WM into 2n(Rkey ) bins
each with an equal amount of codewords. All terminals
(including Eve) know this private-key codebook.
 Alice and Bob find the sequence WM = (W1;    ;WM )
in the RB based private-key codebook, and choose its bin
number as the final private key.
I(Y;i;Yi;) = 1  h(q), where
h(x) =  x log2 x  (1  x) log2(1  x)
that is the binary entropy function, with 0 < x < 1=2.
Obviously, h(x) is monotonically increasing in x, when 0 <
x < 1=2. Then, according to Theorem 1, the private key
capacity is
CK = (M   1)minf1  h(qA); 1  h(qB)g:
Another more complicated example with respect to the wire-
less network will be illustrated in Section IV.
A. Proof of Achievability of Theorem 1
Algorithm 1 briefly shows the achievable scheme that is
based on two steps: key agreement and key distillation. Let
RA;i , I(YA;i;Yi;A)  ; RB;i , I(YB;i;Yi;B)  ; (12)
Ri , minfRA;i; RB;ig = Ii   ; for 1  i M: (13)
Moreover, R1;    ; RM are ordered according to R(1)     
R(M), and Rkey ,
PM 1
i=1 R(i).
1) Key Agreement: In the key agreement step, Alice and
Bob agree on M common messages.
First, based on the standard point-to-point techniques [3],
[4], each relay i and Alice agree on a pairwise key using
their correlated sources (Y nA;i; Y
n
i;A). Briefly speaking, relay i
chooses a pairwise key WA;i from WA;i , f1;    ; 2nRA;ig,
and then sends a public message FA;i such that Alice can
estimate this pairwise key as Wi;A. Similarly, relay i chooses
a pairwise keyWB;i fromWB;i , f1;    ; 2nRB;ig, and sends
FB;i such that Bob can estimate this pairwise key as Wi;B .
More details of such a pairwise key agreement have been
provided in [3], [4]. For 80; 1; 2 > 0, the pairwise keys
WA;i and WB;i have the following properties [12], [13], [21]:
(i) W;i and W;i are the same with a high probability, i.e.,
Pr(W;i 6= Wi;)  0; 8 2 fA;Bg; i 2 f1;    ;Mg:
(14)




I(W;i;F;i)  1; 8 2 fA;Bg; i 2 f1;    ;Mg:
(15)






8 2 fA;Bg; i 2 f1;    ;Mg: (16)
(iv) The tuples f(W;i; F;i; Y n;i; Y ni;)g2fA;Bg;i2f1; ;Mg
are mutually independent, due to the definitions of the
PIN model shown in (1).
Remark 3: For the sake of brevity in the following discus-
sion, instead of using both WA;i and Wi;A (WB;i and Wi;B)
to denote the value of the pairwise key between relay i and
Alice (Bob), we will use WA;i (WB;i) to denote both keys
with the understanding that there is a small probability that
WA;i 6= Wi;A (WB;i 6= Wi;B) as shown in property (i).
Second, each relay i sends WA;i  WB;i over the public
channel to help Alice and Bob to decode both the two pairwise
keys. Then, they choose the one with a smaller size as
the common message, denoted as Wi, i.e., Wi = WA;i if
RA;i  RB;i; Wi = WB;i, otherwise. This implies that the
alphabet of Wi is Wi = f1;    ; 2nRig. Assuming, without
loss of generality, Wi = WA;i, i.e., RA;i  RB;i, then these
common messages can be proved to be secret from the public
discussion. Specifically, denote the overall public discussion
sequence as F , (FA;i; FB;i;WA;i WB;i)i2f1; ;Mg, then
1
n
















where (a) follows from property (iv) of the generated pairwise
keys, as mentioned above, and the fact the Wi is determined
by WA;i and WB;i; (b) follows from the first property of the
generated pairwise keys, as mentioned above. The security
constraint for the case where Wi = WB;i can be proved
symmetrically.
Now, a proposition is given as follows, which will be used
later in the next step.
Proposition 1: These RVs, W]m[;F; Xnm;Wm, form a
Markov chain: W]m[   F   (Xnm;Wm), where W]m[ ,
fWigi2f1; ;Mg;i 6=m.
5Proof: Specifically, the conditional pmf,
p
 
w]m[jf ; xnm; wm

, can be expressed as
p
 



























































where (a) follows from the definition that Xn]m[ ,




; (b) and (c)





, where F]m[ , f(FA;i; FB;i;WA;i
WB;i)gi2f1; ;Mg;i6=m; and (d) follows from the fact that




, i.e., WA;i and WB;i are
determined by (F; Xni ) in the pairwise key generation.
2) Key Distillation: In the key distillation step, both Alice
and Bob map these insecure common randomness (i.e., the
common messages (W1;    ;WM )) assembled from the key
agreement step into the unique codeword in the private-key
codebook, and set the bin number of this codeword as the
final private key. We will provide more details of the RB-
based codebook in the following.
Codebook Generation: In advance, randomly and uni-
formly partition all sequences wM in the set WM ,
W1  W2      WM into 2n(Rkey ) bins each with
2n(R(M)+) codewords, where wM = (w1;    ; wM ) and
wi 2 Wi = f1;    ; 2nRig. So each codeword wM can be
indexed as wM (k; ~k), where k 2 f1;    ; 2n(Rkey )g, ~k 2
f1;    ; 2n(R(M)+)g. Fig. 2 illustrates the binning assignment
(i.e., private-key codebook), denoted by C, that is known by
all terminals (including Eve). C can be viewed as a RV, where
the randomness is introduced by the random bin assignment.
bin 1
( , ) (2,1)
M M














Fig. 2. The binning assignment for the private-key codebook, where wM =
(w1;    ; wM ) 2 WM , wi 2 f1;    ; 2nRig.
Decoding and key generation: Based on the M common
messages obtained in the key agreement step, Alice and
Bob can find their corresponding indices in the private-key
codebook. Specifically, knowing (W1;    ;WM ), Alice finds
the index pair (k; ~k) from the private-key codebook such that
wM (k; ~k) = (W1;    ;WM ). Then, it sets its key as KA = k.
Similarly, Bob can also find its key as KB = k.
From the decoding process, KA 6= KB if and only if the
values of the common message sequence (W1;    ;WM ) es-
timated by Alice and Bob are different. In addition, according
to the key agreement step, the values of the common message
sequence estimated by Alice and Bob are different if and only
if Wi; 6= W;i for some  2 fA;Bg, i 2 f1;    ;Mg. Thus,
the probability that KA 6= KB can be expressed as




















 1  (1  0)2M , 1(0) (19)
where (a) is due to (14). Obviously, 1(0)! 0 as 0 ! 0.
Analysis of the key rate: Since the private-key codebook
generation is based on the random binning assignment, aver-
aged over the codebook (i.e., C), KA is uniformly distributed
on f1;    ; 2n(Rkey )g. Therefore, it can be obviously ob-
tained that H(KAjC) = n(Rkey   ).
Analysis of the secrecy constraints: For m 2 f1;    ;Mg,
we will prove that the generated private key is secret from
relay m. Fist, consider the following proposition of a Markov
relationship.
Proposition 2: These RVs, KA;Wm;F; C; Xnm, form a
Markov chain: KA   (Wm;F; C) Xnm.
Proof: Define WM , (W1;    ;WM ). The conditional
pmf, p (kAjwm; f ; c; xnm), can be expressed as



































kAjwM ; f ; c

= p(kAjwm; c; f); (20)
where (a) follows by the definition of w]m[ in Proposition 1,
i.e., w]m[ = fw1;    ; wm 1; wm+1;    ; wMg, and the fact
that wM = (w]m[; wm); (b) is based on the Markov chain
in Proposition 1 and the fact that random codebook C is
independent of (WM ;F; Xnm); and (c) is due to the fact that
KA is determined by (WM ; C) as shown in the key generation
process.
6Then, averaged over C, we have
I(KA;F;X
n
mjC)  I(KA;F;Wm; XnmjC)
(a)
= I(KA;F;WmjC)
 I(KA;WmjC) + I(KA;WM ;FjWm; C)
(b)
= I(KA;WmjC) + I(WM ;FjWm)
(c)
 I(KA;WmjC) + nM1
= I(KA;WmjC) + nM1: (21)
where (a) is based on Proposition 2; (b) holds since KA is de-
termined by WM for a given codebook, and C is independent
of (WM ;F); (c) is due to (17) and the relationship:
I(WM ;FjWm)  I(WM ;Wm;F) = I(WM ;F):
Furthermore,
I(KA;WmjC) = I(KA;WM ;WmjC)  I(WM ;WmjKA; C)
= I(WM ;WmjC) H(WM jKA; C)
+H(WM jWm;KA; C)
= H(WmjC) H(WM jKA; C)
+H(WM jWm;KA; C): (22)
Since Wm is independent of C, obviously the first term can
be upper bounded as
H(WmjC) = H(Wm)  log(Wm) = nRm: (23)
From (16), we have H(Wi)  n(Ri   2), and hence
H(WM )  nPMi=1(R(i)   2). Thus, the second term can
be lower bounded as
H(WM jKA; C) = H(WM jC) +H(KAjWM ; C) H(KAjC)
= H(WM jC) H(KAjC)




(R(i)   2)  n(Rkey   )
= n(R(M) +  M2): (24)
The third term is bounded using the following lemma.
Lemma 1: When R(M) = maxfR1;    ; RMg and n is
sufficiently large, then
H(WM jWm;KA; C)  n(R(M)  Rm + 2()): (25)
Proof: This lemma can be proved following a similar
approach with existing relevant works, such as [39] (proof of
Lemma 22.3) and [25], with some necessary variations. The
details are provided in Appendix A.
Combining (22) with (23), (24) and (25), we have
1
n
I(KA;WmjC)  2() +M2   : (26)





mjC)  2() +M(1 + 2)  : (27)







I(i)   (M   1)
is achievable.
B. Proof of Converse of Theorem 1
The basic idea of the calculation of the upper bound is based
on M symmetric enhanced channels. For the m-th enhanced
source model, m = 1;    ;M , we only consider the secrecy
constraint on relaym, and ignore the secrecy constraints on the
other relays. Moreover, Alice and Bob are assumed to know
the observations of two subsets of relays a priori, respectively.
The definitions of the two subsets are given in the following.
For a givenm 2 f1;    ;Mg, we form two sets of terminals
A]m[ and B]m[ as follows. First, allocate Alice and Bob to
A]m[ and B]m[, respectively. Second, for relay i, i 6= m, if
I(YA;i;Yi;A) > I(YB;i;Yi;B), allocate it to A]m[; otherwise,
allocate it to B]m[. Thus, if relay i lies in A]m[,
I(YB;i;Yi;B) = minfI(YA;i;Yi;A); I(YB;i;Yi;B)g; (28)
if the relay i lies in B]m[,
I(YA;i;Yi;A) = minfI(YA;i;Yi;A); I(YB;i;Yi;B)g: (29)
Then, assume, without loss of generality, that relays A1,
A2,    , Aj are allocated to A]m[, and relays B1, B2,    ,
BM 1 j are allocated to B]m[, 0  j M   13. In this case,
fA1;    ; Ajg
\
fB1;    ; BM 1 jg = ;;
and fA1;    ; Ajg
[
fB1;   ; BM 1 jg
= f1;    ;m  1;m+ 1;    ;Mg:
Thus, A]m[ = fAlice, relays A1,    , Ajg; B]m[ =fBob, relays
B1,    , BM 1 jg.




;    ; XnBM 1 j ), which are the observations of all
terminals in sets A]m[ and B]m[, respectively. Then C(D)K can









q) +H(KAjXnm; F q)
(b)
 H(KAjXnm; F q) + n1
(c)
 H(KAjXnm; F q) H(KAjKB) + n(1 + 2)
 H(KAjXnm; F q) H(KAjKB ;XB;]m[; Xnm; F q)
+ n(1 + 2) (30)
(d)
= I(KA;XB;]m[jXnm; F q) + n(1 + 2)
 I(KA;XA;]m[; F q;XB;]m[jXnm; F q) + n(1 + 2) (31)
(e)
= I(XA;]m[;XB;]m[jXnm; F q)+n(1 + 2); (32)
3If j = 0, fA1;    ; Ajg = ; and A]m[ = fAliceg; if j = M   1,
fB1;    ; BM 1 jg = ; and B]m[ = fBobg.
7where (a) is due to (6); (b) is due to the private key require-
ment in (8); (c) is due to the condition that Pr(KA 6= KB) 
 and Fano’s inequality, so we have H(KAjKB)  n2; (d)
follows from the fact that KB is determined by (XnB ; F
q);
(e) follows from the fact that KA is determined by (XnA; F
q).
Note that Eqs. (30) and (31) have assumed that XA;]m[ and
XB;]m[ are known by Alice and Bob for key generation,
respectively.
Since deterministic functions are considered for C(D)K , 81 
l  q, it holds that
(1) H(FljXnB ; F l 1) = 0 if l mod (M + 2) = 0;
(2) H(FljXnA; F l 1) = 0 if l mod (M + 2) = M + 1;
(3) H(FljXni ; F l 1) = 0 if l mod (M + 2) = i, 8i 2
f1;    ;Mg.
Therefore, when l mod (M+2) = 0 or l mod (M+2) = i,
where i 2 fB1;    ; BM 1 jg,
I(XA;]m[;XB;]m[jXnm; F l)
= H(XA;]m[jXnm; F l) H(XA;]m[jXB;]m[; Xnm; F l)
= H(XA;]m[jXnm; F l) H(XA;]m[jXB;]m[; Xnm; F l 1)
 H(XA;]m[jXnm; F l 1) H(XA;]m[jXB;]m[; Xnm; F l 1)
= I(XA;]m[;XB;]m[jXnm; F l 1): (33)
When l mod (M + 2) = M + 1 or l mod (M + 2) = i,
where i 2 fA1;    ; Ajg,
I(XA;]m[;XB;]m[jXnm; F l)
= H(XB;]m[jXnm; F l) H(XB;]m[jXA;]m[; Xnm; F l)
= H(XB;]m[jXnm; F l) H(XB;]m[jXA;]m[; Xnm; F l 1)
 H(XB;]m[jXnm; F l 1) H(XB;]m[jXA;]m[; Xnm; F l 1)
= I(XB;]m[;XA;]m[jXnm; F l 1): (34)
When l mod (M + 2) = m, obviously we have
I(XA;]m[;XB;]m[jXnm; F l) = I(XA;]m[;XB;]m[jXnm; F l 1);
since Fl is determined by (Xnm; F
l 1).
Iteratively repeating the above procedure q times results in
I(XA;]m[;XB;]m[jXnm; F l)  I(XA;]m[;XB;]m[jXnm):
Furthermore, define
~XnA , XnAnY nm = (Y n1;A;    ; Y nm 1;A; Y nm+1;A;    ; Y nM;A);
~XnB , XnBnY nm = (Y n1;B ;    ; Ym 1;B ; Ym+1;B ;    ; Y nM;B):
Now, according to Eq. (32), C(D)K is upper bounded as
n(C
(D)







A1 ;    ; XnAj ; ~XnB ; XnB1 ;    ; XnBM 1 j )
(b)
= I( ~XnA; X
n
A1 ;    ; XnAj ; ~XnB ; XnB1 ;    ; XnBM 1 j )
(c)
= I(Y nB1;A;    ; Y nBM 1 j ;A; Y nB;A1    ; Y nB;Aj ;
~XnB ; X
n




Y nB1;A;    ; Y nBM 1 j ;A; Y nB;A1    ; Y nB;Aj ;









































dependent of ( ~XnA; ~X
n
B) and also independent of X
n
i , i 6=
m; (b) is due to the fact that Y nm;A   Xnm   Y nm;B is




);    ; (Y nAj ;A; Y nA;Aj )

is independent of any
other random variables in (35); (d) is due to the PIN model
in which

(Y nB1;B ; Y
n
B;B1
);   ; (Y nBM 1 j ;B ; Y nB;BM 1 j )

is in-
dependent of any other random variables in (36); (e) is due
to the fact that the source observations are i.i.d.; (f) is due to
the partition criterion as shown in (28) and (29), where Ii is
defined in Eq. (9).
Next, considering all the M enhanced source models (i.e.,








Im + + 1 + 2: (39)
The upper bound for C(D)K has been proved. On the other
hand, we will deal with randomized encoding and key gen-
eration as following. Let VA, VB and Vi be the random
variables at Alice, Bob and relay i, i 2 f1;    ;Mg, which




1 ;    ; XnM .
Note that randomization is essentially equivalent to using
deterministic functions of these random variables, messages
received from the public channel, and source observation
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Fig. 3. A system diagram for the cooperative wireless network with multiple
relays, where Alice and Bob wish to agree on a private key.
at each terminal. Based on this equivalence, it is not diffi-
cult to prove that I(Yi;A; VA;YA;i; Vi) = I(Yi;A;YA;i) and
I(Yi;B ; VB ;YB;i; Vi) = I(Yi;B ;YB;i). Thus, according to (39),




















Im + + 1 + 2: (40)
Theorem 1 has been proved.
IV. KEY GENERATION IN THE WIRELESS NETWORK
In this section, we will extend the RB algorithm proposed
for the PIN model into the wireless network, and use estimates
of wireless fading channels as source observations for private
key generation.
A. Model
Fig. 3 shows the considered wireless network, which can
be viewed as a practical example of the PIN model in Section
II, where the correlated source observations can be obtained
from estimates of wireless fading channels. All terminals
are equipped with a single antenna and are half-duplex con-
strained. Furthermore, theseM+2 terminals can transmit over
the wireless and public channels, whereas Eve only receives
messages form these channels without sending signals. For
simplicity, it is assumed that a direct link between Alice and
Bob does not exist, i.e., the channel gain between Alice and
Bob is in deep fading.
Denote hA;i (hB;i) as the fading channel gains between
relay i and Alice (Bob). All channels are assumed to be
reciprocal. It is reasonable to assume that all fading channel
gains and noises are RVs and independent of each other.
An ergodic block fading model is considered, in which all
channel gains remain constant for a block of T symbols
and change randomly to other independent values after the
current block. For simplicity, we assume hA;i  N (0; 2A;i),
hB;i  N (0; 2B;i). Moreover, no terminal knows the values of
hA;i and hB;i a priori, but all terminals know their statistics.
Let the sequences Si = [si(1);    ; si(Li)]T , SA =
[sA(1);    ; sA(LA)]T and SB = [sB(1);    ; sB(LB)]T de-
note the signals sent by relay i, Alice and Bob in Li, LA
and LB channel uses, respectively, where i = 1;    ;M . For
simplicity, we consider an equal power constraint [21] for the









EfSTBSBg  P: (41)
B. Application of Proposed RB Algorithm
Algorithm 1 in Section III-A can be applied for private
key generation in the considered wireless network, where
the correlated source observations at each terminal can be
obtained using an orthogonal training4 method. Specifically,
each fading block is divided into M +2 time slots; all relays,
Alice and Bob take turns to broadcast training sequences
during these time slots. The numbers of symbols in these
time slots are T1;    ; TM , TA, TB , respectively. The tuple
(TA; TB ; T1;    ; TM ) satisfies
TA + TB +
MX
i=1
TM = T; TA; TB ; T1;    ; TM  0 (42)
Suppose that relay i sends a known training sequence Si
of size Ti  1; Alice sends a known training sequence SA
of size TA  1; Bob sends a known training sequence SB of
size TB  1. The energy of each sequence is jjSijj2 = TiP ,
jjSAjj2 = TAP , jjSB jj2 = TBP , where jj  jj denotes the
Euclidean norm.
From the training process, Alice can obtain
estimates (~h1;A;    ; ~hM;A); Bob can obtain estimates
(~h1;B ;    ; ~hM;B); relay i can obtain estimates
(~hA;i; ~hB;i), i = 1;    ;M . Here the pairs
f(~hi;; ~hi;)g2fA;Bg;i2f1; ;Mg are mutually independent.
The details of how to obtain these correlated channel
estimates have been provided in many existing works (e.g.,
[21], [22]), which are omitted here for simplicity. The mutual










4 + (Ti + T)22;iP
!
;
8 2 fA;Bg; i 2 f1;    ;Mg (43)
4For an orthogonal training method, all terminals transmit training symbols
in orthogonal time slots, which has been adopted in most relevant works
[17]–[22]. A non-orthogonal training method was proposed in [23], for
which Alice and Bob transmit training symbols simultaneously to confuse
all untrusted relays. This training method requires perfect synchronization,
which is challenging to implement in practice. This paper only considers the
orthogonal training method, unless otherwise state.
9where 2 is the variance of the noise at each terminal in the
training process.
In the following corollary, we will justify that the proposed
RB algorithm is optimal.
Corollary 1: Among training-based approaches for private
key generation, Algorithm 2 achieves the optimal key rate,
i.e., RGkey bits per channel use (BPCU), for some tuple












where IGi , minfIGA;i; IGB;ig, and IGA;i and IGB;i are given in
(43).
Proof: Using the observations from channel estimation,
Ii defined in (9) can be evaluated as
Ii = minfI(~hi;A; ~hA;i); I(~hi;B ; ~hB;i)g = IGi
for a given tuple (TA; TB ; T1;    ; TM ). Then, according to
the private key capacity in (10), we can obtain the key rate
shown in Eq. (44), where the factor 1=T is due to the fact that
each channel gain keeps unchanged for T symbols, and only
one value of the channel statistics can be observed for every
T symbols.
Now, we will prove the optimality of RGkey in Eq. (44).
According to [19], [21], we know that, from the training
process, the optimal pairwise key between Alice (Bob) and
relay i is IGA;i (I
G
B;i), for a given tuple (TA; TB ; T1;    ; TM ).
Thus, according to the result of the private key capacity
in Theorem 1, RGkey is the optimal rate for a given tu-
ple (TA; TB ; T1;    ; TM ). So the proposed RB algorithm
is optimal among training-based approaches for private key
generation.
To further show the impact of the proposed scheme on
the performance gain of the key rate, the multiplexing gain
(introduced in [21]) is studied.
Corollary 2: For the considered wireless network with M
relays, the proposed RB algorithm achieves the optimal multi-
plexing gain among training-based key generation approaches,
that is M   1.
Proof: Based on the definition of in [21], the multiplexing
gain of the proposed algorithm is limP!1RGkey=Rs, where
Rs =
1
2T log2 P as P !1.
From Eq. (43), it is easy to obtain that limP!1 IGi =Rs =





= M   1:
Furthermore, from Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, obviously
this multiplexing gain is optimal.
Remark 4: For the private key generation algorithm in [21]
(Corollary 10) without the direct link between Alice and Bob,
its multiplexing gain is bM=2c. Compared to the XOR scheme,
the proposed RB scheme effectively enhances the performance
of the private key generation.
Remark 5: The main difference between the proposed al-
gorithm and that in [21] lies in the key distillation step: the
former is based on the RB process and the latter is based
on an XOR process. In [21], Alice and Bob concatenate
(W1W2;    ;WM 1WM ) as the final private key in the
key distillation step. HereM is assumed to be an even number.
Compared the proposed algorithm with the algorithm in [21],
the proposed algorithm pays less price for satisfying the
secrecy constraints at the relays, i.e., the proposed algorithm
utilizes RB to provide the necessary randomness in the private-
key codebook, and the dummy message in each bin is used to
confuse all relays simultaneously.
C. Numerical Results
In this subsection, the performance of the proposed RB al-
gorithm will be illustrated by using some numerical examples.
The block length is set to be T = 20, and the variances of the
channel gains are set to be 2A;i = 
2
B;i = 1, i = 1;    ;M .
Moreover, the variances of all Gaussian noises are set to be
2 = 1.





















M=2, Proposed RB scheme
M=2, XOR scheme in [21]
M=4, Proposed RB scheme
M=4, XOR scheme in [21]
M=6, Proposed RB scheme
M=6, XOR scheme in [21]
Fig. 4. Comparison of key rates of the two key generation algorithms.
Figure 4 compares the proposed RB algorithm with the
XOR algorithm in [21], where the key rate is shown as a func-
tion of the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), with different number
of relays. When M = 2, the two algorithms achieve the same
key rate. But when M increases, the proposed RB algorithm
outperforms the XOR one. Moreover, the performance gap
between these two schemes enlarges as M increases.
Figure 5 compares the key rates of these two algorithms as a
function of the number of the relays (i.e., M ), where the SNR
is fixed as 20dB. In addition, the key rate without secrecy
constraints at the relays [21] is also shown in the figure.
Specifically, the slope of the proposed RB algorithm is the
same as that without secrecy constraints at the relays, whereas
the slope of the XOR algorithm is less. This is because the
multiplexing gain of the proposed RB algorithm is M   1,
whereas the multiplexing gain of the XOR algorithm is about
M=2, as discussed in Remark 4.
V. DISCUSSION
In this section, the proposed RB algorithm as well as the
developed principles used to establish the private key capacity
in the previous section will be extended to several more
general PIN models.
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Proposed RB scheme, oblivious
XOR scheme in [21], oblivious
No secrecy constraint on the relays
Fig. 5. Key rates vs the number of relays, where the SNR is fixed as 20dB.
A. Direct Link between Alice and Bob
The PIN model in Section II assumes that no direct link
exists, i.e., no correlated source exists between Alice and Bob.
This subsection considers the case that Alice and Bob observe
n i.i.d. repetitions of the correlated RVs, YB;A and YA;B ,
respectively. Following the definition of the PIN model in (1),
the pair (YB;A; YA;B) is assumed be independent of any other
pair (Yi;; Y;i), 8 2 fA;Bg, i 2 f1;    ;Mg. The private
key capacity of this PIN model is given in the following.
Corollary 3: For the PIN model with direct link be-
tween Alice and Bob, the private key capacity is CK +
I(YB;A;YA;B), where CK is defined in (10).
Proof: Based on the point-to-point key generation tech-
nique [3], [4], Alice and Bob can agree on a pairwise key,
denoted as KA;B , whose rate is I(YB;A;YA;B). From Section
III-A, a private key (whose values are KA and KB at Alice
and Bob, respectively) can be generated using the proposed
RB algorithm. Similar to Remark 3, for brevity, we use KA
to denote both KA and KB with the understanding that
they are different with a small probability. Then, Alice and
Bob concatenate KA and KA;B as the private key. Such a
private key (KA; ~KB;A) is obviously secret from both Eve
and all relays. Since KA and KA;B are independent due to
the definition of the PIN model, the achievable rate of the
private key (KA;KA;B) is CK + I(YB;A;YA;B).
On the other hand, The converse can be proved by extending
the proof steps in Section III-B in a straightforward manner.
B. Secrecy Constraint on Part of Relays
The secrecy constraint in (8) for the PIN model in Section
II requires the generated key to be secret from all relays.
However, when the generated key is required to be secret from







q)  ; 8m 2 f1;    ;Mpg; (45)
where without loss of generality, KA is assumed to be secret
from relays 1;    ;Mp, 1  Mp  M . The private key
capacity of this PIN model with the secrecy constraint on part
of relays is given in the following corollary.
Corollary 4: When the generated key is required to be










where Ii is defined in (9).
Proof: The proof of this corollary is trivial, which can
be obtained by extending the proof steps of Theorem 1 in a
straightforward manner.
C. Colluding Relays
The secrecy constraint in (8) for the PIN model in Section II
corresponds to the case that all relays are non-colluding. When
part of the relays are colluding, i.e., they collaborate with each
other to intercept the private key, the secrecy constraint in (8)











q)  ;8m 2 fMc + 1;    ;Mg; (47)
where without loss of generality, the relays 1;    ;Mc are
assumed to be colluding, and relays Mc+1;    ;M are non-
colluding, 1 Mc M . The private key capacity of this PIN
model with part of colluding relays can be determined in the
following corollary.
Corollary 5: When relays 1;    ;Mc are colluding, the















Proof: In this colluding case, relays 1;    ;Mc are equiv-
alent to a super relay node that utilizes the joint observation
(Xn1 ;    ; XnMc) in order to intercept the private key informa-
tion. Then, this corollary can be proven by extending the proof
steps of Theorem 1 in a straightforward manner.
D. Group Key Generation
The PIN model in Section II requires to generate a private
only between two terminals. This subsection considers the
private key generation problem among L terminals, L  2.
Consider a cooperative DMS model with M + L terminals.
Denote L , f1;    ; Lg and M , fL + 1;    ; L + Mg.
All terminals in L wish to share a private key with the
help of the terminals in M, i.e., the terminals in M act
as the M relays. For 8l 2 L and m 2 M, let Ym;l and
Yl;m denote the correlated source observations at terminals l
and m, respectively. Specifically, terminal l observes n i.i.d.
repetitions of the RV Xl , (Y1;l;    ; YM;l), denoted as
Xnl , (Y nL+1;l;    ; Y nL+M;l); terminal m observes n i.i.d.
repetitions of the RV Xm , (Y1;m;    ; YL;m), denoted as
Xnm , (Y n1;m;    ; Y nL;m). In this PIN model,
I(Yi;; Y;i;fYj; ; Y;j : (j; ) 6= (i; )g) = 0;
for i; j 2M;;  2 L: (49)
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Algorithm 2: Extension of RB Algorithm for Group Key
Generation
Step 1: Key Agreement:
 Terminals l andm agree on a pairwise keyWl;m from the
correlated observations (Y nm;l; Y
n
l;m), 8l 2 L, m 2M.
 Terminal m chooses the shortest key among
fW1;m;    ;WL;mg, denoted as Wlm;m, 8m 2 M;
then, it successively sends Wlm;m Wl;m, 8l 2 Lnlm,
from which all terminals in L can obtain Wlm;m.
Step 2: Key Distillation:
 In advance, randomly partition all sequences ~wM in
~WM ,Wl1;1     WlM ;M into 2n(R
(g)
key ) bins each
with an equal amount of codewords. All terminals know
this private-key codebook.
 All terminals in L find the sequence ~WM =
(Wl1;1;    ;WlM ;M ) in the RB based private-key code-
book, and choose its bin number as the final private key.
Note that the considered PIN model only includes correlated
sources between all terminal pairs (l;m)8l2L;m2M, but does
not include correlated sources between any terminal pair in
the same set L nor M. For this cooperative PIN model, an
achievable group key rate is given in the following corollary.
Corollary 6: An achievable group key rate of the consid-









where I(g)(1)  I(g)(2)      I(g)(M), which is the ordering of
(I
(g)
1 ;    ; I(g)M ), and
I(g)m , min
l2L
I(Yl;m;Ym;l); 8m 2M: (51)
Proof: The rate in (50) can be achieved by extending the
proposed RB algorithm in Section III-A. Such an extended
algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 2, which also includes
the key agreement and key distillation steps. Since Algorithm
2 is obtained by slightly modifying Algorithm 1 in Section
III-A, we only briefly describe it in the next.
In the key agreement step, every terminal pair (l;m)
agrees on a pairwise key Wl;m, 8l 2 L, m 2 M; then
relay m sends Wlm;m  Wl;m, 8l 2 Lnlm, from which
all terminals in L can obtain Wlm;m, where Wlm;m is the
shortest key among (W1;m;    ;WL;m). Denote Wm;l ,
f1;    ; 2n(I(Yl;m;Ym;l) )g, soWlm;m 2 Wlm;m , 2n(I
(g)
m  ),
which is the m-th common message among all terminals
in L. In the key distillation step, randomly partition all
sequences ~wM in ~WM ,Wl1;1 Wl2;2     WlM ;M into
2n(R
(g)
key ) bins, and all terminals in L choose the bin number
of the sequence ~WM = (Wl1;1;    ;WlM ;M ) in the RB
based private-key codebook as the final private key. Following




From Theorem 1, the achievable rate in Corollary 6 is
optimal when L = 2. The following corollary shows that the
achievable rate in Corollary 6 is also optimal when the number
of relays is M = 2.
Corollary 7: When only two relay nodes exist, i.e.,M = 2,
the group key capacity of the considered PIN model is C(g)K ,
minfI(g)1 ; I(g)2 g.
Proof: When M = 2, from Corollary 6, C(g)K can be
achieved by the proposed RB algorithm in Algorithm 2.
To prove the converse, we can consider two enhanced source
models. For the first enhanced model, we only consider the
secrecy constraint on terminal L + 1, and ignore the secrecy
constraint on terminal L + 2. Moreover, assume that there
is a genie-aided terminal that knows the source observations
of all terminals in the set G, where G = f1;    ; l  
1; l + 1;    ; L; L + 2g and l = argminl2L I(Yl;2;Y2;l).
Furthermore, such a genie-aided terminal and terminal l wish
to generate a secret key which is protected from terminal L+1,
denoted as Kl . From Section III-B, the capacity of Kl can
be upper bounded as I(g)1 (defined in (51)).
Obviously, the group key capacity C(g)K is upper bounded
by the capacity of Kl , and C
(g)
K  I(g)1 can be obtained.
Similarly, we have C(g)K  I(g)2 by constructing the second
enhanced model.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated the problem of private
key generation. A particular cooperative PIN model withM+2
terminals is considered, where Alice, Bob and M relays
observe pairwise independent sources. With the help of the
relays, Alice and Bob wish to establish a private key that
is secure from Eve and all relays. In this paper, we have
presented a single-letter characterization of the private key
capacity of this PIN model, where the achievability part is
proved via a RB algorithm for generating the private key,
and the converse part is proved by deriving upper bounds of
M enhanced source models. Then, we further considered a
cooperative wireless network, in which estimates of wireless
channels are considered as the correlated source observations.
Compared to the XOR algorithm in [21] whose multiplexing
gain is bM=2c, the proposed RB algorithm achieves a larger
multiplexing gain M   1. Finally, several more general PIN
models are investigated, by applying the basic idea of the
proposed achievable scheme.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
First, H(WM jWm;KA; C) can be expressed as




M jwm; kA; C):
(52)
Given (wm; kA) and a codebook c, denote W^M as the
set which is formed by all codewords wM satisfying: (i)
wM 2 WM ; (ii) wM lies in the kA-th bin of the private-key
codebook; (iii) the m-th element of wM is wm. Furthermore,
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let N(wm; kA; c) = jW^M j, which denotes the number of
codewords in W^M . Since all sequences wM 2 WM are
randomly partitioned when constructing the codebook, av-
eraged over the RB-based codebook C, the probability that
the m-th element of a codeword is wm is 2 nRm . Thus,
N(wm; kA; C) is binomially distributed averaged over C, i.e.,
N(wm; kA; C)  B(2n(R(M)+); 2 nRm), where 2n(R(M)+)
is the number of codewords in the kA-th bin. Thus, the
expectation and variance of N(wm; kA; C) can be expressed
as
E[N(wm; kA; C)] = 2 nRm2n(R(M)+) = 2n(R(M) Rm+);
(53)
V ar[N(wm; kA; C)] = 2 nRm2n(R(M)+)(1  2 nRm)
 2n(R(M) Rm+): (54)
Now, define an indicator function with respect to
N(wm; kA; C) as
Id(N(wm; kA; C)) =
8<: 1; if N(wm; kA; C) 2 E[N(wm; kA; C)]
0; otherwise.
(55)
Then, by Chebyshev inequality
PfId(N(wm; kA; C)) = 1g  V ar[N(wm; kA; c)]E2[N(wm; kA; c)]
 2 n(R(M) Rm+): (56)
Thus, by using H(Id)  1, we have




PfId = igH(WM jwm; kA; C; Id = i)
 1 + PfId = 1g log2 jWM j+H(WM jwm; kA; C; Id = 0)









where the last relationship is due to (56), and the fact that
N(wm; kA; C) < 2  2n(R(M) Rm+) if Id = 0. Recalling
(52),
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